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Abstract
We analyze the welfare effects of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)
between the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). Earlier TTIP studies analyze
welfare effects in a framework where output and welfare coincide. We believe that the utility
function of households, which depends on consumption and employment, is the best criterion
for assessing TTIP. We measure the welfare effect of TTIP as the percentage of consumption
that  households  would  be  willing  to  pay  for  TTIP in  order  to  remain  as  well  off  with  it  as
without it. The welfare effects of TTIP, which eliminates tariffs and cuts non-tariff measures,
are always positive for the US and the EU. The reason is that the welfare gain of higher
consumption  more  than  offsets  the  welfare  loss  of  a  change  in  employment.  The  policy
implication is that the US and the EU should continue the negotiations for the TTIP agreement.
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21 Introduction
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is a comprehensive agreement
being negotiated between the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). According to
the European Commission (2017), the aim of TTIP is “to help people and businesses by:
opening up the US to EU firms, helping cut red tape that firms face when exporting, and setting
new rules to make it easier and fairer to export, import and invest overseas.” It also notes that
TTIP could help the EU affect global trade rules. The Office of the United State Trade
Representative (2017) says that TTIP is an opportunity for American people and businesses to
get better access to EU markets, which would support the US economy. Both the European
Commission (2017) and the Office of the United State Trade Representative (2017) argue that
imported products meet high standards that protect not just people's health and safety, but also
the environment.
The pros and cons of TTIP are debated. Felbermayr et al. (2015a), for instance, agree that
advantages have both economic and geostrategic components: the elimination of tariffs and
non-tariff measures (NTMs) between the US and the EU should increase trade and output,
while regulatory cooperation should help to impose Western standards on the world trade
system. Felbermayr et al. (2015a) emphasize that critics claim that the possible benefits are
modest and fear that TTIP may trigger a race to the bottom in health, safety, labor, and
environmental standards.
Trade economists typically use static models to evaluate the consequences of trade agreements
(see e.g. Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare 2014). The focus is on a detailed sectoral structure in a
large set of countries. The trade literature analyzes long-term effects, arguing that trade
liberalization affects the structure of the economy in the long term. It typically does not study
adjustment dynamics of endogenous variables and ignores the fact that trade agreements are
typically phased in over a number of years. Existing TTIP studies belong to this tradition.
The main contributions of our paper are to analyze adjustment dynamics and the welfare effects
of TTIP in a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. Our
DSGE model, based on Ganelli and Tervala (2015), is different from those used in the existing
TTIP literature  by  allowing  us  to  analyze  transition  dynamics  of  TTIP.1 Petri  and  Plummer
(2016) emphasize—in the context of the Trans-Pacific Partnership—that trade policy is
gradual. Ghironi (2016) argues—in the context of the Trans-Pacific Partnership—that it is
1 Capaldo (2014) uses an old Keynesian model to analyze TTIP. However, Bauer and Erixon (2015) highlight
that the model Capaldo (2014) uses is not designed to analyze the effects of trade agreements. Most notably,
Bauer and Erixon (2015, 2) note that it is “a demand-driven model that does not make efforts to capture the
supply-side effects of trade which are the effects that are proven to be the core positive effects of trade
liberalization.”
3important to account for the adjustment dynamics of major trade deals, which extend far
beyond reductions in tariffs. In contrast, all other main TTIP studies use static trade models
and, therefore, are unable to analyze adjustment dynamics to gradual trade liberalization. The
earlier TTIP literature evaluates the long-term trade and output effects of TTIP (Aichele et al.
2014, Berden et al. 2009, Felbermayr et al. 2015b, Fontagné et al. 2013, and Francois et al.
2013). Aichele et al. (2014) and Felbermayr et al. (2015b) argue that they analyze the welfare
effects of TTIP, but these welfare results come from a modeling setup where real income and
welfare coincide. Therefore, their welfare measure is, in effect, the change in real income that
is  equal  to  output.  Raza  et  al.  (2014)  criticize  TTIP studies  since  they  neglect  or  downplay
adjustment costs, such as changes in employment. We believe that the utility function of
households, not just consumption, is the relevant welfare measure and provides the best
objective in terms of which the pros and cons of TTIP should be assessed. In our model, the
welfare effect of TTIP depends not only on current and future changes in consumption but also
on current and future changes in employment and the initial level of employment. We measure
the  welfare  benefit  of  TTIP  in  consumption  equivalent  terms:  as  the  percentage  of  initial
consumption that households would be willing to pay for TTIP in order to remain as well off
with the TTIP case as without it.
Felbermayr (2015) argues that an important feature of the quantitative modeling of TTIP is the
scenario definition, because regulatory coherence is the key of TTIP and researchers can only
guess the exact nature of the partnership before its conclusion. Following the work of Francois
et  al.  (2013)  and  Fontagné  et  al.  (2013),  our  baseline  scenario  is  that  TTIP  leads  to  the
elimination of tariffs and a cut in NTMs of 25%.
Our simulations show that the welfare effects of TTIP are always positive for the US and the
EU. The reason for the positive welfare effect is that the welfare gain caused by higher
consumption more than offsets the welfare loss caused by an increase in employment. The
policy implication of our results is that the US and the EU should continue the negotiations for
the TTIP agreement. The discounted present value of the welfare gain of TTIP is in the range
of 1.5% to 3.8% of initial consumption. This means that TTIP yields the welfare improvement
that corresponds to a one-off 1.5-3.8% increase in consumption. In dollar terms, the welfare
gain for a US (EU) citizen corresponds to a one-off 780-2,000 (510-1,300) US dollars increase
in consumption. These welfare results are all new since the existing literature contains no
analyses of the welfare effects of TTIP.
Berden et al. (2009), Francois et al. (2013), and Fontagné et al. (2013), who analyze the
identical scenario, find that TTIP increases output in the US and the EU on average by 0.2-
0.4% in the long term. In our model,  the long-term output effect  is  in the range of 0.2% to
0.4%, depending on the parameterization. So our results are fully consistent with earlier TTIP
studies.
4Following earlier TTIP studies, we also look at the effects of a TTIP agreement that is limited
to liberalizing tariffs only. A tariffs-only agreement induces a considerably smaller output
effect, which is in line with the other TTIP papers. Our main focus is, however, on welfare.
The welfare gain of a tariffs-only agreement is  roughly one-third of the welfare gain of the
baseline scenario. Therefore, we can conclude that the bulk of the welfare gain of TTIP is
induced by cuts in NTMs. This result is new since the existing TTIP studies contains no
analyses of the welfare effects of TTIP.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents
the parameterization of it. Section 4 analyzes the effects of TTIP, focusing mostly on the
welfare  effects.  It  also  examines  the  sensitivity  of  the  main  results  to  variations  in  key
parameters values. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Model
In this section, we introduce a New Keynesian model of trade liberalization that is based on
Ganelli and Tervala (2015). We go beyond their approach in that we allow for both tariff and
non-tariff barriers, because the latter constitute the major barriers to trade between the US and
the EU. Furthermore, we allow trade barriers to be adjusted gradually.
The world is made up of two countries: home and foreign.2 Firms and households are indexed
by ]1,0[Îz . Households and firms over the [0,n) interval are located in the home country,
whereas the rest [n,1] are located in the foreign country. In the description of the model, if the
equations are symmetric across countries, we present only domestic ones
A two-country model implies that there is no third country (or the rest of the world) so that
some relevant transmission channels are absent. First, the trade diversion effect of a trade
agreement, which Cheong et al. (2015) find important, is absent. This implies that the welfare
effect may be overestimated in a two-country model. Second, Li et al. (2016) show that
regional trade agreements benefit member countries, in terms of output and trade, while non-
member countries typically lose. In the context of TTIP, Felbermayr et al. (2015b) find that
the effects on non-TTIP countries’ output is on average negative due to the negative trade
diversion effect. On the other hand, Francois et al. (2013) find that the effects of TTIP on the
rest of the world is positive because the positive trade creation effect outweighs the negative
trade diversion effect.
2 The use of a two-country model implies that we ignore the effects on third countries. Li et al. (2016) show that
regional trade agreements benefit member countries, in terms of output and trade, while non-member countries
typically lose.
52.1 Households
The domestic household’s lifetime utility is given by
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In this equation 10 << b  is the discount factor, tC  is a consumption index to be defined below,
c is a positive parameter, tM  is nominal money balances, 0>e  is  the  inverse  of  the
consumption elasticity of money demand, )(tsP  is the consumption price index, )(zlt  is  the
household’s labor supply, and n  is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The expression )(tP
denotes the fact that the price index is a function of the trade barriers, which we denote as t .
They  are  the  sum of  a  tariff  ( ttt )  and  NTMs (
NTM
tt ):
NTM
t
T
tt ttt += . Price indexes and the
effect of trade barriers on them are shown below.
The overall consumption index is given by3
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where htC  and
f
tC  represents the consumption of domestic and foreign goods, respectively,
and ρ > 0 is the cross-country substitutability (the elasticity of substitution between domestic
and foreign goods). ak nº )10( <<k  denotes  the  share  of  domestic  goods  in  the
consumption basket, which depends on the relative size of the home country (n) and the degree
of home bias in consumption (α > 1). htC and
f
tC are aggregates of domestic and foreign goods,
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3 The foreign consumption index is
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** ak nº )10( * << k  denotes the share of domestic goods in the
foreign consumption basket. Home bias requires α* < 1.
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where )(zc ht  and )(zc
f
t  are the respective consumption levels of differentiated domestic and
foreign good z by the domestic household, and θ > 1 is the within-country substitutability (the
elasticity of substitution between two goods produced in the same country).
We assume, for the sake of simplicity, that both countries impose (ad valorem) tariffs and
NTMs on all imported goods. The optimal allocation of consumption between different types
of goods is governed by the following demand functions:4
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The consumer price index is ( )[ ] rrr tkkt --- -+= 1 111 )()1()( fthtt PPP , the domestic price index
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holds for producer prices but not for consumer prices in our model. Households allocate their
total consumption between domestic and foreign goods, taking into account relative prices
(including trade barriers), the cross-country substitutability, and the degree of home bias in
consumption. The effect of trade liberalization is clearly visible here: a reduction in trade
barriers reduces the price of imported goods and thereby the consumer price index.
The budget constraint of the domestic household is given by5
4 The corresponding foreign equations are
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5 The budget constraint of the foreign household, because the bond is denominated in the domestic currency, is
( )( ) ********** 1* 11** )()()(1 tttttttttttttt TPCPzlwMSDiSDM tpt ++-+++=+ --- ,
7( ) tttttttttttt TPCPzlwMDiDM )()()(1 111 tpt ++-+++=+ --- , (5)
where 1-tD denotes an internationally traded bond purchased in period t-1 that pays one unit of
domestic currency plus the nominal interest rate 1-ti  in period t. The term tw  represents the
nominal wage rate, tp is nominal dividends (profits), and tT  denotes real transfers from the
government.
The optimal choices with respect to the intertemporal allocation of consumption, the labor
supply and money demand is given by
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Equation (6) is a consumption Euler equation. Equation (7) shows that a reduction in trade
barriers increases the supply of labor by decreasing the price level, thereby increasing the real
wage. Equation (8) determines the demand for money.
2.2 Government and Trade Liberalization
We assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the government repays tariff and seigniorage
revenues to households in a lump-sum manner. The government budget constraint, in per-
capita terms, can be written as6
1
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In equation (9), the first term on the right hand side is revenue from import tariffs. It depends
on the tariff rate ( Ttt ), consumption of foreign goods, and their domestic currency price.
where ௧ܵ  is the nominal exchange rate, defined as the price of the foreign currency, expressed in the domestic
currency. A global asset-market clearing condition requires that 0)1( * =-+ tt DnnD .
6 The foreign tariff revenue (R*) from import tariffs is ( )tthtTtt SzpzcR 1)()(*** t= .
8Our way to analyze the effects of TTIP differs from the traditional approach in that we also
analyze transition dynamics, rather than just the long-term effect. For that reason, the timing
of the implementation of liberalization measures is crucial. Therefore, we must model trade
liberalization caused by TTIP differently. Petri and Plummer (2016) emphasize—in the context
of the Trans-Pacific Partnership—that trade policy is gradual. Because this seems reasonable
for TTIP as well, we assume that it will have a gradual effect on transatlantic trade barriers.
We assume that the change in effective trade barriers is given by
( ) ttt etlt ˆˆ1ˆ 1 +-=+ , (10)
where l  is—loosely speaking—the “depreciation rate of trade liberalization” and teˆ
represents an unexpected change in trade barriers. Percentage changes from the initial steady
state (denoted by the subscript zero) are denoted by hats; for example, 0ˆ ttt tt d= . Trade
liberalization is modeled as a permanent negative shock to trade barriers. Equation (10)
captures the idea that a trade policy change caused by the TTIP deal is gradual and after some
time the steady-state level of trade barriers is lower than before.
Finally, we assume a constant supply of nominal money balances, that is, 1-- tt MM = 0 for all
t. This implies that lump-sum transfers from the government to household are equal to tariff
revenues.
2.3 Firms
The domestic firm maximizes its profits
)()()()( zlwzyzpz ttt
h
tt -=p , (11)
taking into account the production function )()( zlzy tt =  and the demand curve for its goods.
The trade barriers do not appear in equation (11), because we assume that they are borne by
consumers. However, because the demand functions of consumers are affected by trade
barriers, there is an indirect effect on profits. As shown in Ganelli and Tervala (2015), the
profits can be written as
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9As shown in Ganelli and Tervala (2015), the optimal price under Calvo pricing (Calvo 1983)
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where st ,z  is the stochastic discount factor between periods t and s, γ is the probability that a
firm is able to reset its price and
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The log-linear version of equation (13) can be written as
( ) ththt wzpzp ˆ1)(ˆ)(ˆ 1 bgbg -+= + .
Thus, the change in the optimal price is a weighted average of the changes in current and future
nominal marginal costs, which in this model are solely determined by nominal wages.
2.4 Consolidated Budget Constraint
As shown in Ganelli and Tervala (2015), the consolidated budget constraint for the domestic
economy can be written as
)()(1 zyzpDDCP t
h
tttttt +-= - d , (15)
where tP is the domestic price index without trade barriers.
The model is log-linearized around a symmetric steady state, where initial net foreign assets
are zero )0( 0 =D . Equation (15) therefore implies that 00 yC = . As in Ganelli and Tervala
(2015), the initial level of employment and output is
n
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This equation illustrates that the level of output depends on trade barriers and the within-
country substitutability. Trade barriers increase the price level, and this in turn reduces the
labor supply and output.
3 Parameterization
The parameterization of the model, summarized in Table 1, is chosen to match the features of
the US and the EU. We choose 2012 as the base year in order to make the comparisons to the
other TTIP studies easier. In 2012, the GDPs of the US (roughly 16,200 USD billions) and the
EU were (roughly 16,600 USD billions) almost of equal size (Felbermayr 2014). We set the
relative size of the home country (n) to 0.5. This simplifies the analysis.
We interpret periods as quarters. Thus the discount factor is set to 0.99. The consumption
elasticity of money demand )1( e is  set  to 1,  based on Mankiw and Summers (1986).  The
Frisch elasticity of labor supply (n ) is set to 1, based on Keane and Rogerson (2012).
Table 1. Parameterization of the Model
Parameter Baseline value Description
b 0.99 Discount factor
N 0.5 Relative size of the
domestic economy
e 1 Inverse of the
consumption elasticity of
money demand
n 1 Frisch elasticity of labor
supply
q 11 Within-country
substitutability
r 3 Cross-country
substitutability
g 0.75 Calvo parameter
TBt 0.028 Initial tariff rate
NTMt 0.181 Initial NTM
l 0.2 Depreciation rate of trade
liberalization
teˆ )´200.209))0.136(-((1- Trade liberalization shock
Α 1.895 Home bias parameter
α* 0.105 Home bias parameter
11
The within-country substitutability (θ) is set to 11, which implies a 10% markup in the steady
state. This is consistent with the markup estimates of Basu and Fernald (1997). They apply
firm-level theory to relatively aggregated US data and within manufacturing use data on
industries defined typically at the two-digit level of US Standard Industrial Classification
codes. As discussed in Ganelli and Tervala (2015), in a model with endogenous labor supply,
the degree of the within-country substitutability is a key parameter for the welfare analysis of
trade reforms because it affects the initial output level (though not the response of the economy
to shocks). If the within-country substitutability is low, then initial output is low and an
increase in output and consumption (of given size) increases welfare substantially.
As highlighted by Drozd et al. (2014), the empirical literature points out that international trade
reacts substantially to persistent price changes but not to temporary ones that take place on
business cycle frequency. This implies that the estimates of the cross-country substitutability
differ significantly, depending on the time horizon, with lower short-term estimates than long-
term estimates. Consequently, they highlight that different estimates are used in international
macroeconomics and trade, depending on the question at hand. In international
macroeconomics, which focuses on high-frequency time-series predictions of models, it is
typical to use low short-term estimates, whereas in the trade literature, which focuses on cross-
sectional implications, high long-term estimates are typically used.
On the one hand, in international macroeconomics, the cross-country substitutability is often
set to the range of 1 to 2. On the other hand, referring to the empirical work of Anderson and
van Wincoop (2004) and Bergstrand et al. (2013), Felbermayr et al. (2015b) argue that the
trade elasticity—the elasticity of substitution between goods minus one—of 7 is plausible for
models that use aggregate trade flows. Our baseline choice for the cross-country
substitutability is 3. This is a compromise between values used in the macro and trade
literature, and is roughly consistent with the findings of Feenstra et al. (2017), who use a
consumption index similar to ours. They find that the median estimates of the micro elasticity
(elasticity between alternative import suppliers) are between 3.2 and 4.1, whereas the macro
elasticity (elasticity between domestic and foreign suppliers) may be somewhat lower. We later
assess how sensitive the welfare effects of TTIP are to changes in the cross-country
substitutability in particular, since higher values may be more realistic in the long term.
Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) find that the trade-weighted median price duration of US exports
and imports is roughly one year. Based on this, we set the Calvo parameter (γ) to 0.75 so that
the average delay between price adjustments is one year (four periods).
Trade barriers are the sum of tariffs and NTMs. Fontagné et al. (2013) find that the ad valorem
tariff rate on bilateral trade is on average 2.2% in the US and 3.3% in the EU. We set the tariff
rate to the average of these numbers, 2.8%. We would like to emphasize that this number hides
12
heterogeneity in terms of tariff protections between the EU and the US that Fontagné et al.
(2013) find. In most sectors, EU tariffs are low (0.2-3.7%) but somewhat higher than US tariffs.
However, the EU average tariffs on motor vehicles (8.0%) and processed foods (14.6%) are
much higher than the US tariffs (1.2% and 3.3%, respectively).
Felbermayr (2015) argues that a key feature of the quantitative modeling of TTIP is the
measurement of NTMs. The TTIP literature uses the NTM estimates of Berden et al. (2009),
who calculate an NTM index based on regulatory divergences and any type of non-tariff
measure. They find that NTMs increase the cost of doing business and restrict market access
for firms. They estimate sector-specific additional costs to trade across the Atlantic stemming
from NTMs. They find (their Table 4.2) that the sector-specific additional costs due to NTMs
vary between 2% and 73% in trade cost equivalents, meaning that NTMs correspond to a 2 to
73 percent tariff rate. However, the sector-specific additional costs are typically between a few
percent to about 30%. The lowest costs to trade are in personal, cultural and recreational
services; construction; and electronics. By far the highest are in food and beverages.7 The costs
of NTMs for US exports to the EU and for EU exports to the US are on average 18.5% and
17.7%, respectively, in ad valorem equivalent  terms.  We set  NTMs to  18.1%,  which  is  the
average of these numbers. So the initial overall trade barrier, the sum of tariffs and NTMs, is
20.9%.8
Our scenario is that TTIP eliminates tariffs entirely and reduces NTMs, while we ignore several
key elements of TTIP. Berden et al. (2009) introduce the concept of actionability, the degree
to which NTMs can realistically be reduced over a period of 10 years. They find that up to
roughly 50% of all NTMs are actionable. Therefore, they analyze the consequences of 25%
and 50% reductions in NTMs. Raza et al. (2014, VII) argue the degree of actionable NTMs of
Berden et al (2009) is “too high to be realistically achievable.” Francois et al. (2013) and
Fontagné et al. (2013) analyze trade liberalization that leads to a cut in the tariff rate of 98–
100% and a cut in NTMs of 25%. We assume that TTIP leads to the elimination of tariffs and
a cut in NTMs of 25%. This means that the trade barrier is reduced from 20.9% to 13.6%.
As mentioned earlier, a key difference of our model relative to the earlier TTIP literature is
that we also analyze the short- and medium-term adjustment of the economy. In the basic case,
we assume that the “depreciation rate of trade liberalization” )(l  is 0.2 and the size of the
7 Disdier et al. (2016) provide an assessment of the impacts of TTIP on the agri-food sector.
8 As pointed out by a referee, the paper incorporates NTMs into trade barriers as an additive form by quantifying
them to equivalent tariff rates. This implies that the welfare effect of a reduction of NTMs is not different from
that from tariff changes. Tariff changes, however, may affect the volume of international trade or output through
changes in the goods' prices, while NTMs may affect the volume of international trade or output not through the
price but in a different way. Therefore, future TTIP studies should explore various forms of NTM measures.
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permanent trade liberalization shock )ˆ( te  is )´´ l1000.209))0.136(-((1- . Together, these
parameters imply that trade barriers are gradually reduced from 20.9% to 13.6%.
Home bias parameters (ߙ	and	ߙ∗) are set such that the import-to-GDP ratios match the US–
EU trade. However, we have to simplify the analysis assuming balanced trade. Consequently,
the share of imports is identical in both countries, which means that	ߙ∗ = (1 − ݊ߙ)/݊.
According to Felbermayr (2014), EU exports to the US were roughly 550 USD billion, while
US exports to EU were roughly 455 USD billion in 2012. Therefore, the EU import-to-US
GDP ratio was somewhat above 3%, while the US import-to-EU GDP ratio somewhat below
3%. We set α to 1.895 and α* to 0.105, implying that the initial import-to-GDP ratio is 3% in
both countries.9
4 Welfare Effects of TTIP
In this section, we analyze the welfare consequences of TTIP. Lucas (1987) analyzes the
welfare effects of business cycles, expressed in consumption units. Following the idea of Lucas
and a more recent method of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007), which is commonly used in the
DSGE literature, we measure the welfare benefit of trade liberalization as the percentage of
consumption that households would be willing to pay for liberalization in order to remain as
well off with the liberalization case as without it. As shown in Ganelli and Tervala (2015), the
percentage of initial consumption that the household is willing to pay for trade liberalization (
tw ), referred to as the value of trade liberalization in the figure, in period t is
].1)ˆˆ)(1[exp(100 110 ---´=
+
ttt llC
nbw (17)
The discounted present value (DPV) of the welfare effect, measured by a percentage of initial
consumption, is
].1))ˆˆ()(1[exp(100 110 ---´=
+
¥
=
-å ss
ts
ts
DPV llC
nbbw (18)
Equation (18) illustrates that the welfare effect of TTIP depends on current and future changes
in consumption, current and future changes in labor supply and the initial level of labor supply.
The welfare effect depends negatively on changes in labor supply due to the disutility of labor
supply. It is, however, worth observing that the initial level of labor supply, determined by
equation (16), is smaller than one. Therefore, and identical increases in consumption and labor
supply always increase welfare.
9 We use the method of Klein (2000) and McCallum (2001) to simulate the model.
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4.1 Results for the Baseline Calibration
In  this  section,  we  analyze  the  consequences  of  TTIP.  Figure  1  shows the  effects  of  TTIP,
which is signed in period 1 on the main variables. The horizontal axes indicate time in all
figures. Figure 1(a) shows the level of trade barriers. The vertical axes in panels (b) and (c)
show percentage deviations of output and international trade from the initial steady state (SS).
Panel (d) shows the value of trade liberalization in each period, determined by equation (17),
which is measured by a percentage of initial consumption.
Figure 1. Dynamic Effects of TTIP
Figure 1(a) shows that trade barriers are gradually reduced. Our way of modelling of trade
barriers implies that they begin to decrease one quarter after the TTIP deal is signed. Trade
liberalization reduces distortions on the labor supply (recall equation (7)) because it increases
real wages by decreasing the consumer price level. Figure 1(b) illustrates that TTIP increases
output gradually, which is due to the gradual reduction in trade barriers that exert a gradual
deflationary pressure. One year after the TTIP deal is signed, output has increased 0.08%,
while the long-term effect is 0.16%.10 Countries and shocks are identical, and consequently
10 One can see that in the quarter when TTIP is signed, output drops slightly. This is caused by the expectation of
reduced trade barriers in the next period while the present has not yet changed much: households expect prices to
fall from then on and the incentives to work and consume more to increase. But in the initial period, neither the
marginal utility of holding real money balances (due to the constant nominal money supply) nor the incentive to
work more hours are much affected, while the real interest rate rises due to the expected deflation. This latter
effect results in a fall in current consumption (see equation (6)).
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TTIP increases output in both countries by the same amount. In addition, changes in outputs
are identical to changes in consumption. Figure 1(b) therefore shows the percentage deviation
of consumption from the initial steady state too. Moreover, the linear production function
implies  that  output  it  equal  to  employment.  So  Figure  1(b)  also  shows  the  response  of
employment. The positive output effect of trade liberalization is consistent with the empirical
evidence of Dollar and Kraay (2004). In a survey, Cirera et al. (2013) find that liberal trade
policy is associated with higher employment. Berden et al. (2009) is the only paper in previous
literature that analyzes the short-term output effects (“an immediate impact”) of TTIP. They
find that output increases in the short term by 0.05% in the US and 0.11% in the EU. In our
paper, the output effect one year after the shock is in line with these results.
Table 2 provides an overview of the related TTIP literature and summarizes the main findings
of our paper and other TTIP studies.11 Table 2 shows that our finding regarding the size of the
long-term output effect is smaller than in Berden et al. (2009), Fontagné et al. (2013), and
Francois et al. (2013). A common factor of all these studies is a rather small increase in GDP.
Aichele et al. (2014) and Felbermayr et al. (2015b) find a much larger output effect. The key
difference is that their scenario is different: a NTM reduction in the reference scenario
corresponds to the estimated trade creation effects of previous regional trade agreements
(RTA). Therefore, the size of trade liberalization is much larger, which explains the remarkable
difference in output and trade effects.
Figure 1(c) illustrates that international trade increases gradually following gradual
liberalization. The trade effect in our model is much larger than in Berden et al. (2009) and
Fontagné et al. (2013), but smaller than in Francois et al. (2013). The trade effect in Aichele et
al. (2014) is completely different. This is due to the different scenario. Consequently, a
comparison of our results with theirs is difficult.
Figure 1(d) plots the welfare effect, measured by the percentage of initial consumption that the
household is willing to pay for TTIP in each period, as shown by equation (17). It shows that
households are willing to pay 0.004% of their initial consumption to avoid TTIP in the first
period, which means that the welfare effect is negative. However, the welfare effect quickly
turns positive. In an imperfectly competitive economy, an increase in output and consumption
that brings them closer to their efficient levels increases welfare. In the new steady state, TTIP
yields a welfare gain that corresponds to a 0.0016% increase in private consumption. Based on
the World Bank (2016) data on 2012 (the base year) GDP per capita in 2014 US dollars, the
annual welfare benefit of TTIP on a US (EU) citizen corresponds to an 8 (5) dollar increase in
consumption in the steady state.
11 Several papers address the effects of TTIP. We compare our results with studies that we regard as most closely
related.
16
Table 2. Basic Assumptions and Main Results
This study Berden
et al.
(2009)
Fontagné
et al.
(2013)
Francois et
al. (2013)
Felbermayr
et al.
(2015b)
Aichele
et al.
(2014)
Basic assumptions
Model type DSGE CGE
(GTAP7)
CGE
(GTAP)
CGE
(GTAP8)
Gravity
model
Gravity
model
Name of
reference
scenario
Baseline
scenario
Limited
scenario
Reference
scenario
Ambitious
experiment
Benchmark Deep
TTIP
Tariff
reduction
100% Goods:
100%;
services
75%
100% 100% 100% 100%
NTM
reduction
in reference
scenario
25% 25% 25% 25% Trade
creation by
RTA
Trade
creation
by RTA
Forecasting
period
Dynamic
model; 2012
base year
10 years;
2008–
2018
10 years;
2015–
2025
10 years;
2017–2027
Unclear;
2012 base
year
Unclear;
2007
base
year
Main findings
EU GDP 0.16% 0.32% 0.3% 0.48% 3.9% (EU
average)
2.12%
US GDP 0.16% 0.13% 0.3% 0.39% 4.9% 2.68%
Change in
EU exports
to US
17% 0.9% 7.6% 28.0% 212%
Change in
US exports
to EU
17% 2.7% 10.1% 36.6% 171%
Welfare 1.5% of
consumption
Table 2 shows that the DPV of the welfare gain of TTIP is 1.5% of initial consumption. We
would like to emphasize that this is defined as the one period consumption equivalent change
in the DPV of flow utility for TTIP. Under the baseline parameterization, households are
willing to pay 1.5% of their initial consumption for TTIP in order to remain as well off with
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the TTIP case as without it. The DPV of the welfare gain of TTIP on a US (EU) citizen, based
on the World Bank (2016) data on 2012 GDP per capita in 2014 US dollars, corresponds to a
one-off (roughly) 780 (510) US dollars increase in consumption. These results are new, since
the existing literature has not assessed the welfare effects of TTIP.
4.2 Robustness Checks: Varying Parameters
In this section, we check how sensitive the main results are to changes in key parameter values.
We  first  analyze  the  role  of  the  Frisch  elasticity  of  labor  supply  and  the  within-country
substitutability, and then we shed light on the cross-country substitutability. Table 3
demonstrates the dependence of the welfare effects of TTIP on the within-country
substitutability and the Frisch elasticity. The within-country substitutability is usually set in
the range of 6 to 20 in macro models, implying a massive range of markups between 5% and
20%, also implying a range of possible initial output and consumption levels. We therefore
employ these two boundary values in order to shed light on the upper and lower bounds of the
welfare effects of TTIP.
Keane and Rogerson (2012) find that the Frisch elasticity can be as high as 2, whereas Chetty
et al. (2013) argue that it should be set to 0.5 on the intensive margin. Therefore, we vary it
between 0.5 and 2. The main innovation of Ganelli and Tervala (2015), relative to the existing
models in the literature on trade agreements, is to show that the welfare effects of trade
liberalization are sensitive to the Frisch elasticity, because an endogenous labor supply changes
the underlying steady state.
Table 3. The Welfare Effects of TTIP:
The Role of Different Within-Country Substitutabilities and Frisch Elasticities
6=q 11=q
(benchmark)
20=q
5.0=n 1.7 1.0 0.59
1=n
(benchmark)
2.7 1.5 0.90
2=n 3.6 2.0 1.2
First, Table 3 reveals that an increase in the Frisch elasticity implies an increase in the welfare
effect of TTIP. This is because the stronger is the labor supply response to trade liberalization,
the stronger the boosts to output and consumption. Second, the lower is the within-country
substitutability, the bigger the welfare effect. This is because a low elasticity implies a low
initial level of employment and output, such that an increase in output and consumption will
increase welfare more. Overall, Table 3 shows that the range of possible values of these two
elasticities allows for welfare effects in the range of 0.59% and 3.6% of initial consumption.
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Raza et al. (2014) highlight that the elasticity of substitution between goods is crucial for TTIP
studies because it governs how strongly the model will react to trade liberalization. In our
model, the cross-country substitutability can differ from the within-country substitutability.
The latter affects only the level of initial employment and output, but not the response of the
economy. Consequently, in our model, the cross-country substitutability is important.
Raza et al. (2014) calculate that the unweighted elasticity of substitution between goods used
in Berden et al. (2009) is 6. Unfortunately, Fontagné et al. (2013) do not mention the elasticity
of substitution that they use. The unweighted elasticity of substitution used in Francois et al.
(2013, Table 5) is 6.3. Felbermayr et al. (2015b) set the trade elasticity - the elasticity of trade
with respect to trade costs - to 7 in their benchmark parameterization. They also discuss that
the elasticity of substitution between goods, which measures how changes in the price for
foreign goods influences demand for foreign goods, and the trade elasticity are closely related,
since the trade elasticity is  equal to the elasticity of substitution minus 1.  In our model,  the
cross-country substitutability measures alone how fluctuations in the price for foreign goods
affect demand for foreign goods. Consequently, the cross-country substitutability plus 1 is
equal to the trade elasticity. So Felbermayr et al. (2015b) set effectively the cross-country
substitutability to 8. In Aichele et al. (2014), the average elasticity of substitution between
goods is 5.6. In alternative parameterizations, we set the cross-country substitutability to 6, as
in Berden et al. (2009) and Aichele et al. (2014), and to 8, as in Felbermayr et al. (2015b).
Table 4 shows the consequences of varying the cross-country substitutability, while we keep
the import-to-GDP ratio constant at 3% by changing the home bias parameters.12 Arkolakis et
al. (2012) show the welfare effects of trade in several key trade models depend on only two
key parameters:  the share of imported goods and the trade elasticity.  They show that in the
basic Armington model, where goods are differentiated by the country of origin, welfare
depends on only consumption, which, in turn, depends on real income. Changes in real income
in turn depend on changes in the terms of trade. In addition, terms-of-trade changes are affected
by the trade elasticity. A low trade elasticity implies a larger welfare effects of trade
liberalization. In the context of TTIP, Felbermayr et al. (2015b), for instance, show that lower
values of the elasticity of substitution lead to a higher output effect of TTIP, since domestic
and foreign goods are less easily substitutable. Table 4 illustrates that we find the opposite. We
need to emphasize that it shows the consequences of varying the cross-country substitutability,
while we change the home bias parameters that govern the shares of imported goods. We do it
because we wish to keep the initial import-to-GDP ratio constant at the empirically observed
level. If we increase the cross-country substitutability and keep the home bias parameters
constant,  then  the  share  of  imported  goods  falls.  In  this  case,  we  will  find  a  result  that  is
12 Please note that the import-to-GDP ratio is a positive function of both the home bias parameter and the cross-
country substitutability.
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consistent with trade models: a lower value of the elasticity of substitution leads to a higher
welfare effect following trade liberalization. On the other hand, when we vary the home bias
parameters to keep the import-to-GDP ratio at 3%, the welfare effects of TTIP depend
positively on the degree of the cross-country substitutability, because households respond by
supplying more labor. One of the features of the framework (Ganelli and Tervala 2015) used
in this paper is to alter the underlying steady state of the trade models by the introduction of
endogenous labor supply. In case of a high cross-country substitutability, TTIP further
increases trade and output. In an imperfectly competitive economy with endogenous labor
supply, an equal increase in employment and consumption that brings them closer to their
efficient levels increases welfare.
As seen in Table 4, the DPV of welfare gain is as high as 3.8% of initial consumption, in the
case where the cross-country substitutability is 8. In this case, the welfare gain on a US (EU)
citizen, based on the World Bank (2016) data on 2012 GDP per capita in 2014 US dollars,
corresponds to a one-off 2,000 (1,300) US dollars increase (approximately) in consumption.
As discussed in Section 3, Drozd et al. (2014) emphasize that trade reacts substantially
differently to persistent price changes than temporary ones that take place on business cycle
frequency and, consequently, estimates of the cross-country substitutability differ depending
on the time horizon. In this paper, we inspect the consequences of a policy change that shift
relative prices permanently. Therefore, for the question at hand, a high cross-country
substitutability may be a better depiction of reality in the long term. If this is indeed the case,
Table 4 shows that the welfare gains of TTIP are considerable.
Table 4. Sensitivity Analysis: Different Cross-Country Substitutabilities
r = 3
(benchmark)
r = 6 r = 8
Output 0.16% 0.27% 0.38%
Trade 17% 33% 42%
Welfare 1.5% of
consumption
2.7% of
consumption
3.8% of
consumption
In Section 4.1, we find that under the benchmark parameterization the output effect was smaller
than in other TTIP studies (Berden et al. 2009, Fontagné et al. 2013 and Francois et al. 2013)
in which the scenario is identical to ours. The fact that we used a lower value of the cross-
country substitutability in our benchmark parameterization can explain a large part of the
difference in the output results. Table 4 shows that if the cross-country substitutability is set to
6,  the  output  effect  of  TTIP  increases  to  0.27%,  which  is  almost  as  high  as  in  the
aforementioned studies, of which the average output increase is 0.32%.
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An important distinction of our model relative to the TTIP studies is that we also analyze the
adjustment dynamics of the economy, with gradual trade liberalization. If trade liberalization
is instant, the welfare gain of TTIP will be slightly smaller and increase from 1.5% of
consumption to 1.6%.
4.3 Robustness Checks: Tariffs Only
An important analytical issue is the quantitative relevance of the reduction in tariffs and NTMs
when implemented in isolation. Felbermayr (2015) indeed summarizes that all TTIP studies
conclude that the bulk of the trade and output effects stem from cuts in NTMs. Thus, the next
step is to analyze the effects of a TTIP agreement that leads to the elimination of tariffs, while
NTMs are kept constant. That is, the trade barrier is reduced from 20.9% to 18.1%. We show
results for both our benchmark value of the cross-country substitutability (3) and a higher value
that is closer to one employed by the traditional trade literature (6).
Table 5. Summary of the Effects of the Tariffs-Only Agreement
This study
( r = 3)
This study
( r = 6)
Fontagné
et al.
(2013)
Francois
et al.
(2013)
Felbermayr
et al.
(2015b)
Aichele
et al.
(2015)
Tariff
reduction
100% 100% 100% 98–
100%
100% 100%
EU GDP 0.06% 0.1% 0% 0.1% 0.27%
(non-
weighted
EU27
mean)
0.01%
US GDP 0.06% 0.1% 0% 0.04% 0.75% 0%
Welfare 0.57% of
consumption
1.0% of
consumption
Table 5 reveals that a smaller trade liberalization induces an output effect in the range of 0.06%
to 0.1%. These findings are in line with the other TTIP papers, excluding Felbermayr et al.
(2015b). In a “tariffs-only” agreement, the welfare gain becomes smaller and is only 36% the
 baseline scenario’s welfare gain. We can therefore conclude that the bulk of the welfare gain
of TTIP is caused by cuts in NTMs.
5 Conclusions
We contribute to the TTIP literature by employing a DSGE business cycle model that enables
the welfare analysis of TTIP. We find that the welfare gain of TTIP is the range of 1.5% to
3.8% of initial consumption, depending on the parameterization. The welfare gains of TTIP
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are always positive for the US and the EU with the policy implication that the US and the EU
should continue the negotiations for the TTIP agreement.
At the same time, we need to mention the limitations of our approach because it ignores several
channels through which trade liberalization in general and TTIP in particular may affect
welfare. First, there are many additional gains from trade that are elicited in the literature and
that our model is unable to capture, including the traditional gains from specialization, the
gains from access to a larger market allowing the exploitation of scale economies (Krugman,
1980), the gains from the reallocation of resources toward more productive firms resulting in
higher aggregate productivity (Melitz, 2003), and the gains associated from productivity gains
related to importing inputs to production (see the numerous references in the survey by Hornok
and Koren (2016)). All those gains reinforce our argument because they result in aggregate
productivity increases.
Second, and against the backdrop of these gains from trade liberalization, its severe costs and
the unequal distribution of those costs across affected societies also need to be considered. As
Hornok and Koren (2016) report in a survey, there is ample evidence (and theory to explain it)
that trade increases inequality and that the associated costs may be larger than previously
thought. However, the academic debate on the needed redistribution from the winners of
liberalization toward its losers in order to achieve Pareto gains has occupied generations of
trade economists. The lack of sufficient redistribution has been, and continues to be, a serious
concern and should be dealt with more seriously both in the public and in the academic debate.
In particular, the costs of inequality and the costs of redistribution should be taken into account
(Antrak et al. (2017) is a valuable start in that direction), while efforts into an analysis of labor
market policies are needed to inform the public debate (Cosar (2013) and Davidson and Matusz
(2006) are examples in this vein).
Third, we ignore perhaps the most debated aspects of TTIP, which our framework is not able
to address: the standards of investment protection and the Investor State Dispute Settlement
(ISDS). Gaukrodger (2017) examines the balance between the standards of investment
protection and the right to regulate in investment treaties. He points out that some critics of
TTIP argue that it is a transfer of regulatory power away from national public authorities to
arbitrators. Some critics point to claims, which in their view, show that the right to regulate is
inordinately exposed to the rulings of arbitrators in ISDS. Some critics argue the standards of
investment protection are a weapon to fight regulation. Proponents of investment protection,
on the other hand, see the topic differently. Some proponents argue the aim of investment
protection is to protect investment from misuse of the right to regulate because it can be used
at the expense of investors. Some proponents do not regard investment treaties as a risk to the
right to regulate, while some argue that they achieve a proper balance between the standards
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of investment protection and the right to regulate. Our framework is not able to address the
topic and we therefore do not discuss it in this paper.
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